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Abstract
Learning is often understood as an organism’s gradual acquisition of the association between a given sensory stimulus and
the correct motor response. Mathematically, this corresponds to regressing a mapping between the set of observations and
the set of actions. Recently, however, it has been shown both in cognitive and motor neuroscience that humans are not
only able to learn particular stimulus-response mappings, but are also able to extract abstract structural invariants that
facilitate generalization to novel tasks. Here we show how such structure learning can enhance facilitation in a sensorimotor
association task performed by human subjects. Using regression and reinforcement learning models we show that the
observed facilitation cannot be explained by these basic models of learning stimulus-response associations. We show,
however, that the observed data can be explained by a hierarchical Bayesian model that performs structure learning. In line
with previous results from cognitive tasks, this suggests that hierarchical Bayesian inference might provide a common
framework to explain both the learning of specific stimulus-response associations and the learning of abstract structures
that are shared by different task environments.
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Introduction
Since the heyday of behaviourism, stimulus-response theories
of learning are a central theme in the theoretical neuroscience
of learning and have successfully explained a wide range of
experimental data in animal and human learning [1]. In par-
ticular, classical conditioning as propounded by Pavlov and
Skinner’s operant conditioning pioneered the concept that an
animal’s adaptive behaviour is based on associations between
sensory stimuli and motor responses [2–4]. Pavlov believed that
ultimately all of animal and human behaviour would be explained
on the basis of stimulus-response associations. Later, Rescorla and
Wagner formalized such associative learning in a very simple and
powerful learning rule [5,6] that explains a vast array of
experimental effects. In fact, the Rescorla-Wagner rule can be
considered as a form of a previously suggested learning rule, the
delta-rule, that can be used to train simple neural networks [7].
More recent neural network models such as back-propagation
[8,9] and basis function networks [10,11] are simply non-linear
extensions of the originally proposed models in the sense that
they implement a mapping from stimulus to motor response by
adapting (synaptic) weights in networks with fixed topology.
Similarly, most reinforcement learning schemes [12] seek to learn
environment-specific stimulus-response contingencies, rather than
more abstract adaptive policies that can cope with a variety of
different environments.
Critics were quick to point out that stimulus-response theories of
learning liken the nervous system to some kind of ‘‘complicated
telephone switchboard’’ [13] that continuously transforms im-
pinging sensory stimuli into motor responses. Learning in such a
switchboard consists of strengthening and weakening the connec-
tions between input relays and output units. Cognitive scientists
and psychologists have pointed out that many animal behaviours
seem to transcend simple associative learning [14,15], for example
the learning of mental maps [13], insightful learning [16] and
abstract rule learning [17]. Unfortunately, though, these alleged
types of ‘higher order’ learning have often resisted mathematical
formalization. Recent progress in the field of Bayesian learning,
however, suggests that some ‘higher order’ learning phenomena in
cognitive science and neuroscience could be explained by the
process of structure learning.
In contrast to parametric learning that is usually studied,
structure learning is not concerned with learning the particular
contingencies of a single task, for example, a particular stimulus-
response relationship. Rather, structure learning can be regarded
as a process of abstraction that extracts general invariants [18]. In
this way, general forms of a rule can be learned that are widely
applicable to a possibly large set of related tasks. Such structure
learning has been recently reported both in cognitive [19–25] and
motor neuroscience [26,27,18]. Here we study structure learning
in a sensorimotor association task.
Results
To investigate features of structure learning, we exposed
subjects to a stimulus-response learning task, where the stimulus-
response patterns were characterised by different structural
constraints. Subjects were presented with nine possible stimuli
and could respond with one of nine possible actions (see Figure 1A
and Methods for details). This defines a set of nine pairs of stimuli
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 January 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 1 | e8973and their associated correct responses, resulting in 362,880 (9!)
possible one-to-one sensorimotor mappings. Subjects had to learn
six different mappings that were characterised by four different
structural features: (1) an identity mapping that constitutes the
baseline mapping, as it is most readily learned, (2) two shift
mappings, where the correct response was shifted either to the
right or to the left compared to the identity mapping, (3) two
mirror mappings, where the correct response was mirrored around
the vertical or horizontal axis, again compared to the identity
mapping, and (4) a random mapping where stimuli and responses
were not associated by any apparent rule (see Figure 1B). We
counted the number of trials it took subjects to learn any of the
mappings to assess their performance.
Importantly, there were two groups of subjects that learned the
two shift mappings and the two mirror mappings in reversed
order, i.e. the first group went from right-shift to left-shift and from
horizontal to vertical mirror and the second group went from left-
shift to right-shift and from vertical to horizontal mirror. Since
both of the shift mappings shared the shift structure and both of
the mirror mappings shared the mirror structure, we hypothesized
that learning one mapping (e.g. right-shift mapping of the shift
structure) would subsequently facilitate learning of the other
mapping with the same structure (e.g. left-shift). To assess this
hypothesis we analysed the number of learning trials in the two
groups – data shown in Figure 2.
As expected, learning the identity mapping was in most cases
faster than learning any of the other mappings – compare Table 1
and Table 2. Similarly, learning the random mapping was in most
cases much slower than learning any of the structured mappings
(see Table 1 and Table 2), which suggests that mappings with
structural constraints are learned more readily than mappings
without any obvious structure. We also computed for each subject
the ratio between the trials required for learning the random
mapping and the trials required for learning the first shift and the
first mirror mapping (Figure 3A). The median of all the ratios was
significantly smaller than unity (p,0.01, Wilcoxon signed rank
test), which again implies faster learning of the structured
mappings.
Interestingly, we also found within-structure facilitation effects.
For example, learning the second instance of the shift mapping
(e.g. left shift mapping in the first group) proceeded much faster in
most subjects than learning the first instance (e.g. right shift
mapping in the first group). Accordingly, the ratio of learning trials
between the second and the first occurrence of the shift mapping
was significantly below unity (p,0.01, Wilcoxon signed rank test),
which implies facilitation of learning for the second mapping
(Figure 3B). Since the two groups experienced the two shift
mappings in reversed order, this facilitation cannot be accounted
Figure 1. Task description. (A) Subjects had to learn a mapping from
a3 63 stimulus board to a 363 action board. The stimulus was
presented by lighting up one of the nine squares. The subject then had
to press one of the nine response buttons associated to that stimulus.
(B) There were six possible mappings with four different structures (S1
to S4). The identity and the random structure comprised only one
mapping each. The shift structure consisted of a right-shift and a left-
shift mapping. The mirror structure consisted of a horizontal and
vertical mirror mapping.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008973.g001
Figure 2. Numbers of trials required by subjects to learn the
different mappings. (A) The first group learned the right shift before
the left shift and the horizontal mirror before the vertical mirror. (B) The
second group learned the two versions of the shift and mirror
mappings in reverse order. Each group had 10 subjects. Statistical
comparisons between the different mappings in each group can be
found in Tables 1 and 2, and comparisons between the groups in
Table 3. ID=Identity mapping. RS=Right shift mapping. LS=Left shift
mapping. HM=Horizontal mirror mapping. VM=Vertical mirror map-
ping. RND=Random mapping.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008973.g002
Table 1. P-values of paired Wilcoxon signed rank test for
comparing the number of learning trials of two different
mappings in Group 1.
Group 1 ID RS LS HM VM RND
ID - *0.002 *0.004 *0.006 0.016 *0.002
RS - - *0.004 0.91 0.16 *0.006
LS - - - 0.287 0.797 *0.002
HM -- - - 0 . 1 3 1 * 0 . 0 0 2
VM - - - - - *0.002
RND -- - - - -
The highlighted fields show significant differences (P,0.01) between learning
two mappings. ID=Identity mapping. RS=Right shift mapping. LS=Left shift
mapping. HM=Horizontal mirror mapping. VM=Vertical mirror mapping.
RND=Random mapping.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008973.t001
Structure Learning
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mappings. This suggests that by experiencing the first instance of a
shift mapping, subjects have learned something general about shift
mappings that facilitated learning of the second instance.
Furthermore, we observed a similar facilitation pattern for
learning mirrored mappings, as the ratio between the second
and the first occurrence of the mirror mapping was also
significantly below unity (p,0.02, Wilcoxon signed rank test).
To test whether these results could be explained by merely
learning stimulus-response associations we employed four different
learning models to reproduce the observed facilitation effects.
First, we used a simple feed-forward neural network to regress the
different mappings. This translates our task into a supervised
learning problem. To examine the relative speed of learning we
used the number of trials taken to learn the random mapping as a
normalising factor (i.e. number of trials for a random mapping was
taken as unity). We initialized the network with the identity
mapping before learning either the right-shift mapping or the
random mapping. No facilitation was observed for learning the
shift mapping (Fig. 4B, NN-model). We then initialized the
network for the right-shift mapping before learning the left shift
mapping in order to study whether learning a right-shift might
facilitate learning a left-shift. Again there was no facilitation
(Fig. 4B, NN-model). We also used a simple reinforcement
learning model that learned the mappings from only binary
feedback, i.e. reward 1 if the correct action was chosen, and
reward 0 otherwise (see Methods for details). Actions were chosen
according to their value from a softmax-rule, and the action values
were updated using the Rescorla-Wagner rule. We performed the
same three experiments as in the neural network case and again
found no facilitation (Fig. 4B, RL-model).
In Bayesian models, the speed of learning a particular
hypothesis can be influenced by the setting of the prior. We
therefore devised two Bayesian models to account for the observed
facilitation effects – compare Figure 5. We used a standard, non-
hierarchical Bayesian model where the set of hypotheses was given
by the set of all possible mappings. We assigned a higher prior
probability to all the structured mappings considered in this study
Table 2. P-values of paired Wilcoxon signed rank test for
comparing the number of learning trials of two different
mappings in Group 2.
Group 2 ID RS LS HM VM RND
ID - *0.002 0.098 0.016 0.397 *0.002
RS - - 0.16 0.232 0.027 0.084
LS - - - 0.898 0.275 *0.01
HM - - - - 0.137 *0.002
VM - - - - - *0.002
RND -- - - - -
The highlighted fields show significant differences (P,0.01) between learning
two mappings. ID=Identity mapping. RS=Right shift mapping. LS=Left shift
mapping. HM=Horizontal mirror mapping. VM=Vertical mirror mapping.
RND=Random mapping.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008973.t002
Figure 3. Relative facilitation of learning. (A) Mappings with
structural constraints were learned much faster than the random
mapping. (B) Learning the third (fifth) mapping was facilitated in both
groups compared to learning the second (fourth) mapping. Shown are
the medians and the lower and upper quartiles of the trial ratios of all
subjects and the average has been taken over both groups.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008973.g003
Table 3. P-values of paired Wilcoxon ranksum test for
comparing the number of learning trials of different
mappings between Group 1 (G1) and Group 2 (G2).
G1 vs. G2
ID 0.021
RS 0.13
LS 0.382
HM 0.649
VM 0.649
RND 0.014
ID=Identity mapping. RS=Right shift mapping. LS=Left shift mapping.
HM=Horizontal mirror mapping. VM=Vertical mirror mapping. RND=Random
mapping.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008973.t003
Figure 4. Modelling of the facilitation effect. (A) The experimental
data shows a strong facilitation of learning a structured mapping (right-
shift or left-shift) compared to a random mapping (RND). In addition,
there is also a strong facilitation from learning the first instance of a
shift mapping to learning the second instance. (B) The feed-forward
neural network (NN) and the reinforcement learning (RL) model show
no facilitation effects. The non-hierarchical Bayesian model shows a
facilitation effect for the structured mappings if the prior probabilities
of these mappings are elevated. The structure learning (SL) Bayes model
shows both facilitation effects, because by learning the first mapping
the posterior over structures assigns more probability to all other
mappings with the same structure. All plots show median values, for
the model these were computed over 100 simulation runs.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008973.g004
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facilitated learning of structured mappings compared to the
random mapping (Fig. 4B, Bayes model). However, this model
fails to capture the effect of facilitated learning of the second
instance of a structure compared to learning the first instance (e.g.
facilitated learning of the left-shift when preceded by a right-shift).
Therefore, we constructed a hierarchical Bayesian model that not
only does inference over different hypotheses, but also maintains a
probability distribution over different structures. Thus, after
learning a particular hypothesis that is part of a certain structure
(e.g. the right-shift hypothesis of the shift structure) the probability
of that structure is increased. Then, after learning the right-shift
structure the learning of all shift structures is facilitated, because
the prior reflects an increased probability of encountering shift
structures. The hierarchical Bayesian model is therefore able to
account for both facilitation effects (Fig. 4B, SL-Bayes model).
Moreover, we investigated model predictions of how learning
proceeds over trials. We fed the Bayesian model with the action
and observation stream from subjects and computed the
probability the model would assign to choosing the correct action
given the subject’s evidence – compare Fig. 6. When initializing
the Bayesian model with the appropriate priors (as above, see
Methods), both facilitation effects become visible in the response
curves over trials. Learning a shift mapping facilitates learning a
second shift mapping (2
nd and 3
rd map in the upper panels of
Fig. 6), learning a mirror mapping facilitates learning a second
mirror mapping (4
th and 5
th map in the middle panels of Fig. 6),
and learning a random mapping is always slower than learning
any of the structured mappings (lower panels in Fig. 6). These
facilitation effects are also visible in the empirical frequencies of
choosing the correct action as exhibited by subjects (compare
Fig. 6. left panels). To compute these empirical probabilities of
action selection we determined the fraction of subjects that chose
the correct action in any one trial. While there is a good qualitative
correspondence between data and model for the dynamics of
learning, it is important to note that the number of trials required
to achieve comparable performance is very different. Especially,
subjects take roughly double the number of trials for learning the
random mapping compared to an ideal learner (compare Fig. 6.
lower panels).
To investigate possible sources of this difference, we examined
whether subjects succumbed to errors due to forgetting which an
ideal Bayesian actor would not suffer from. We considered two
kinds of errors. We defined the occurrence of the first kind of error
when a wrong response was repeated, i.e. when subjects gave the
same wrong response to a stimulus that they had already seen.
Clearly, an ideal actor would never repeat the same mistake.
Furthermore, we defined the occurrence of the second kind of
error when a correct response was forgotten, i.e. when subjects
gave the wrong response to a stimulus that previously was
answered correctly. Again, an ideal observer would not forget a
correct response. We analysed the occurrence of these two kinds of
errors when subjects learned the different mappings – see Fig. 7.
Both kinds of errors occurred most frequently when learning a
random mapping (p,0.01, Wilcoxon ranksum test), whereas there
were practically no errors when learning the identity mapping.
The numbers of both errors were also reduced when learning a
shift mapping for the second time, if another shift mapping had
been learned before (p,0.05, Wilcoxon ranksum test). For the
mirror mappings the number of errors in the first and second
exposure was not significantly different (p.0.05, Wilcoxon
Figure 6. Trial-by-trial evolution of learning. For the experimental
data we averaged over subjects to compute the probability that the
correct action was chosen on the basis of the fraction of subjects that
chose the correct action in each trial. For the model we determined the
probability of choosing the correct action by computing the probability
of choosing the correct action given the action and observation
stream of each subject and again averaged over subjects. All curves
were smoothed with a Savitzky-Golay-Filter of polynomial order 1 and
length 11.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008973.g006
Figure 5. Graphical Model of the non-hierarchical and the
hierarchical Bayesian model. In the non-hierarchical model the
observations provide evidence for each hypothesis separately. In the
hierarchical model the observations not only provide evidence for the
hypotheses, but also for the different structures (which in turn might
shift some evidence to structure-compatible hypotheses).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008973.g005
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found that the probability of repeating a wrong response was
elevated in early trials of learning a new mapping and that a high
proportion of these repetition errors were consistent with the
previously learned structure – see Fig. 7 (leftside panels). The time
course of forgetting a correct response was qualitatively similar.
However, the probability of forgetting the correct response was
highest a bit later into learning a mapping – see Fig. 7 (rightside
panels, blue lines). The occurrence of errors, however, did not
explain the observed facilitation effects. Disregarding the error
trials leaves the facilitation pattern qualitatively unchanged (Fig. 8),
which ensures that the facilitation pattern is not exclusively due to
forgetting. Thus, our Bayesian model, which does not include the
process of forgetting, is apt to account for the observed facilitation
effects presented in Fig. 1 and 8. However, the difference in time
scales of learning observed in the experiment compared to the
model predictions might be explained by the lack of forgetting in
the model (compare Fig. 6).
Discussion
In our experiments we found that human choice behaviour in a
sensorimotor association task requires structure learning processes
and cannot be accounted for by forming specific associations
between sensory stimuli and motor responses. Many traditional
learning schemes, like the Rescorla-Wagner rule or learning in
feed-forward neural networks with fixed topology, have concep-
tualized sensorimotor learning as acquiring an association between
a stimulus and the correct motor response. The facilitation effects
we observed, however, suggest that humans learn much more than
specific stimulus-response associations, namely that they also learn
to extract abstract invariants that are applicable to a broad class of
tasks. Learning a right-shift mapping, for example, facilitated
learning a left-shift mapping in our task. Similarly, learning a left-
shift mapping facilitated subsequent learning of a right-shift
mapping. Therefore, our results cannot be explained by one of the
two tasks being intrinsically easier than the other one. We
observed a similar facilitation also for different versions of a mirror
mapping. The only model that could explain this kind of
facilitation was a hierarchical Bayesian model that takes
probabilities over structures into account (e.g. shift structure),
such that learning one instance of a structure can lead to higher
prior probability of all the other instances of the same structure,
thereby entailing facilitation. While the model provided a good
qualitative fit to the observed facilitation effects, the time scales of
the predictions were very different from those observed in the
experiment. Subjects learned much slower than the Bayesian
learner, at least partly due to the process of forgetting. Thus, in
future it might be interesting to develop Bayesian models that
include processes of forgetting.
Figure 7. Forgetting errors in learning the different mappings.
Subjects committed two kinds of errors that involved forgetting. The
first kind of error (leftside panels) occurs when subjects repeat a wrong
response to a stimulus that they had already seen. The second kind of
error (rightside panels) occurs when subjects had already pressed the
correct button once, but later on seem to have forgotten this correct
response and pressed a different button when once more confronted
with the same stimulus. The upper panels show the total number of
errors committed by subjects when learning the different mappings.
The middle panels show the probability of an error occurring in each
trial following the first trial of a new mapping (averaged over all
subjects and mappings, in red all false button presses, in blue the two
specific kinds of error). The lower panels show the proportion of errors
that can be explained by stimulus-response patterns consistent with
the previously learned structure (averaged over all subjects and
mappings, in red proportion of all false button presses that can be
explained by previous structure, in blue the proportion of the two
specific kinds of error that can be explained by previous structure). The
frequency histograms were smoothed over 50 trial windows by moving
average.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008973.g007
Figure 8. Facilitation effect in the absence of error trials. (A,B)
Number of trials required by each subject to learn the mappings when
disregarding all the error trials. (C,D) In the absence of error trials the
facilitation effects remain all significant (p,0.02, Wilcoxon signed rank
test).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008973.g008
Structure Learning
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account for structure learning effects in cognitive tasks, especially
in causal reasoning [23,22,24,28]. These previous studies focused
on more complicated learning problems in which the higher-level
inferences made through hierarchical Bayesian inference concern
very abstract forms of knowledge, although there have also been
studies that used Bayesian methods to explain causal inference in
perception [29]. Here we show that the framework of Bayesian
structure learning can explain facilitation effects in a simple
sensorimotor association task. This is of particular interest, because
Bayesian models have also been previously proposed to explain
associative learning [30–32]. Thus, hierarchical Bayesian models
might reconcile the idea of learning specific stimulus-response
pairs with the idea of abstraction or structure learning. Learning
specific stimulus-response pairs is instantiated by learning
particular parameters for a specific mapping (a particular
hypothesis), whereas structure learning also depends on updating
probabilities over different structures that represent more abstract
properties, such that learning a particular mapping also distributes
probability mass to ‘structural neighbours’ that represent similar
mappings.
In psychology, facilitation effects in visual discrimination
experiments have been reported previously for learning intra-
dimensional shifts compared to learning extra-dimensional shifts
[33–36]. For example, when humans are trained using a stimulus
set with a particular relevance dimension on which discriminations
should be based on (e.g. shape), they adapt more rapidly to a novel
stimulus set with the same relevance dimension (intra-dimensional
shift), whereas they adapt more slowly when facing a novel
stimulus set with a different relevance dimension (extradimen-
sional shift, e.g. lines) [34]. Facilitation for intra-dimensional shifts
has been interpreted as the ability to attend to the specific
attributes of a stimulus and to use this information for learning
novel discriminations. However, one could also interpret such
facilitation as structural learning of abstract dimensions such as
colour or shape.
In our experiments subjects could not discriminate explicit
properties of the presented stimuli. Rather they had to extract
abstract invariants or rules of the experienced stimulus-response
mappings. In a Bayesian framework ‘discovering’ such rules means
‘finding’ the best-fitting structure and hypothesis in a given set of
possible structures and hypotheses. This Bayesian account is
entirely compatible with other rule-based approaches to concept
learning [37], but a Bayesian estimator has to maintain a
probability distribution over all alternatives at all times. Therefore,
discovering a ‘new’ rule is only possible if this rule has been
considered already as a possibility in the prior. Furthermore, in
our model we restricted our analysis to structures that actually
occurred in the experiment to keep the model as simple as
possible, while still exhibiting the main effect of structure-specific
facilitation. In future it might be interesting to model more
complex sets of structures.
In this study we employed a very specific notion of stimulus-
response learning, namely learning an association between a given
sensory representation and a given set of motor responses.
However, one might argue that associative learning could also
involve more abstract or higher-order representations in the
nervous system [38]. Such higher-order associations might even
generalize and generate behaviour consistent with structural
learning. Such a broad notion of stimulus-response learning is
certainly consistent with our results, but crucially would involve a
hierarchy of abstraction levels. Such hierarchical organization is a
recurring theme in neuroscience. There have even been attempts
to identify hierarchical control structures in the brain [39]. In a
Bayesian framework hierarchical learning is naturally implement-
ed and captures human learning on multiple scales. Hierarchical
Bayesian inference might therefore provide a synthesis between
classic ‘telephone switchboard’ accounts of learning and more
‘‘insightful’’ learning based on abstraction and structure learning
[14,15].
Methods
Ethics Statement
Twenty naive subjects participated in this study and gave
written informed consent after approval of the experimental
procedures by the Ethics Committee of the Albert-Ludwig
University Freiburg. The subjects were students recruited from
the university environment.
Experimental Procedure
Subjects sat at a computer screen that displayed nine equally
sized squares arranged on a 363g r i d .T h es t i m u l u sc o n s i s t e do f
one of the squares lighting up. Subjects then had to respond by
pressing one of nine buttons that were also arranged in a 363
grid to encourage the idea of a ‘‘geometric’’ or ‘‘spatial’’
mapping (Figure 1A). If they pressed the correct button they
were informed by a high-pitch beep, otherwise there was a low-
pitch tone. Then another randomly selected stimulus lit up.
There were six possible mappings subjects had to learn: Identity,
Right Shift, Left Shift, VerticalM i r r o r ,H o r i z o n t a lM i r r o r ,a n d
Random (Figure 1B). The shift mappings were circular such
that, for example, the right-most button in the right shift would
be mapped to the left-most button in the same row. There were
two groups of subjects (ten in each group) that learned the
mappings in a different order. All subjects started with the
identity mapping. Then the first group learned the above
mappings in the order: Right Shift, Left Shift, Horizontal
Mirror, Vertical Mirror, and Random. The second group had
the order of some of the mappings reversed: Left Shift, Right
Shift, Vertical Mirror, Horizontal Mirror, and Random. Each
mapping was deterministic and bijective, i.e. there was always
one response that was uniquely associated with one stimulus.
Learning of a mapping was considered successful once the
subject had managed to give the right response for each of the 9
stimuli without making any intervening mistakes. Subjects were
indicated that the mapping changed thereafter. We counted the
number of trials for successful learning of a mapping as an
indicator of performance. Subjects were instructed that each of
the nine stimulus squares corresponded to exactly one of the
nine buttons and that they should find the correct button as
quickly as possible. Subjects were not informed about possible
structures of the mappings.
Model 1: Feed-Forward Neural Network
Both the input (x) and output (y) were represented as 9-
dimensional binary vectors. The output was given by a linear
combination of the inputs, such that ~ y y~Wx
I.T h ew e i g h t sw e r e
updated using back-propagation, i.e. W/W{a(t
I
{y
I)x
IT
,
where t
I
represents the target vector( t h ec o r r e c tr e s p o n s e ) .
The learning rate was set to a~0:1.T h en e t w o r kw a si n i t i a l i z e d
by training the identity mapping. Then the random mapping
and the right-shift mapping were learned. We initialized the
network with the right-shift mapping when learning the left-
shift mapping. Performance was assessed as the number of
trials needed for a performance below the error threshold
t
I
{y
I      
     v0:01.
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For each stimulus x[f1,2,:::,9g and action a[f1,2,:::,9g we
defined an action value-function V(x,a). Actions were sampled
from this function according to the softmax-rule: P(ajx)~
exp(bV(x,a))
P
a0 exp(bV(x,a0))
. The parameter b corresponds to the temper-
ature in physical models and regulates exploration. We set b~1:0.
If the sampled action corresponded to the correct response then a
reward of r~1 was delivered, otherwise r~0. The action value-
function was updated using the delta-rule (or Rescorla-Wagner
rule), i.e. V(x,a)/V(x,a)za(r{V(x,a)). The learning rate was
set to a~0:1. We initialized the action-value function with the
identity mapping and then learned both the random mapping and
the right-shift. We then initialized the value function with the
right-shift before learning the left-shift.
Model 3: Non-Hierarchical Bayesian Model
The hypothesis set was given by all possible mappings, which
could be represented by 9! permutations of the numbers 1 to
9 – the identity mapping, for example, would be h1~
 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 , the right-shift mapping h2~ 3,1,2,6,4,5,9,7,8 ,
the left-shift mapping h3~ 2,3,1,5,6,4,8,9,7 , the horizontal
mirror mapping h4~ 7,8,9,4,5,6,1,2,3 , and the vertical mirror
mapping h5~ 3,2,1,6,5,4,9,8,7  (Fig. 1). The likelihood models
were binary such that they assigned the value 1 to all mappings that
were compatible with an observation, and zero otherwise:
P(x~i,a~jjh)~
1 if the ith digit in h is j
0 otherwise
 
When learning the random mapping and the right-shift
mapping, the prior probability was set as follows: P(h1)~0:99,
P(h2)~P(h3)~P(h4)~P(h5)~1000: 0:01
4000z9!{5
and P(hi)~
0:01
4000z9!{5
for i§6. Thus, structured mappings had a thousand
times more prior probability than random mappings. When
learning the left-shift mapping, the prior probability was
assigned mostly to the right-shift mapping such that P(h2)~
0:99 and P(h1)~P(h3)~P(h4)~P(h5)~1000: 0:01
4000z9!{5
and
P(hi)~
0:01
4000z9!{5
for i§6 as previously. This was to assess
whether learning a right-shift mapping might facilitate learning a
left-shift mapping. Actions were chosen stochastically by sampling a
hypothesis from the posterior distribution P(hjx1:ta1:t) and
executing the action suggested by the sampled hypothesis-mapping.
This allowed us to model noisy decision making. If the sampled
hypothesis corresponded to the true hypothesis learning could
proceed much faster because finding the correct answer to a
stimulus allows ruling out all other 8 possible answers to the
particular stimulus, whereas sampling the incorrect hypothesis only
allows eliminating 1 possible answer to that particular stimulus. The
prior probabilities were set manually to ensure that all hypotheses
had non-zero probability mass at the start of learning.
Model 4: Hierarchical Bayesian Model
As in the non-hierarchical model, the hypothesis set was given
by all possible mappings h. Additionally, we introduced four
structures that comprised the various hypotheses. The first
structure S1 was the ‘identity structure’ with only one member,
i.e. the identity mapping h1. The second structure S2 was the ‘shift
structure’ that contained both the right-shift and the left-shift
mapping (h2 and h3). The third structure S3 was the ‘mirror
structure’ that consisted of horizontal and vertical mirror mapping
(h4 and h5). Finally, the fourth structure S4 contained all other
mappings and is referred to as the ‘random structure’. The
likelihood model was the same as in the above model, this time
written as P(x,ajh,S). Additionally, we defined the prior
probabilities P(hjS) as P(h1jS1)~1, P(h2jS2)~P(h3jS2)~1=2,
P(h4jS3)~P(h5jS3)~1=2 and P(hijS4)~
1
9!{5
for i§6. The
posterior over hypotheses can then be computed as
P(hjS,x,a)~
P(x,ajh,S)P(hjS)
P
h0P(x,ajh0,S)P(h0jS)
Importantly, in this hierarchical model we can also compute a
posterior over the structures:
P(Sjx,a)~
P
h P(x,ajh,S)P(hjS)P(S)
P
S 0
P
h0P(x,ajh0,S 0)P(h0jS 0)P(S 0)
:
Thus, learning, for example, the right-shift (h2) will not only
lead to a higher posterior probability of the right shift hypo-
thesis, but also of the shift structure, and therefore can facilitate
learning of the left-shift. When learning the random mapp-
ing and the right-shift mapping, the prior probability over
structures was set as follows: P(S1)~0:99, P(S2)~
P(S3)~2000: 0:01
4000z9!{5
and P(S4)~
0:01
4000z9!{5
. Thus,
structured mappings had a thousand times more prior proba-
bility than random mappings. When learning the left-shift
mapping, the prior probability of the shift structure was elevated.
We set P(S2)~0:99, P(S1)~P(S3)~2000: 0:01
4000z9!{5
and
P(S4)~
0:01
4000z9!{5
as previously. Actions were again sampled
from the posterior P(hjx1:ta1:t), that can be computed as
P(hjx1:ta1:t)~
P
S P(hjS,x1:ta1:t)P(Sjx1:ta1:t).
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